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Abstract
We are in an era of uncertainty over whose rules will govern global economic inte­
gration. With the growing market share of Chinese firms and the power of the 
Chinese state it is unclear if Western firms will continue to dominate transnational 
governance. Exploring these dynamics through a study of contract rules in the global 
cotton trade, this article conceptualizes commodity chain governance as a contested 
process of institution-building. To this end, the global commodity chain/global value 
chain (GCC/GVC) framework must be revised to better account for the broader 
institutional context of commodity chain governance, institutional variation across 
space, and strategic action in the construction of legitimate governance arrangements. 
I provide a more dynamic model of GCC governance that stresses how strategic 
action, existing institutions, and dominant discourses intersect as firms and states 
compete for institutional power within a commodity chain. This advances our 
understandings of how commodity chain governance emerges and chan ges over time.
Keywords
transnational governance, commodity chain, legitimacy, institutional change, contract 
arbitration
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Introduction
We are in an era of uncertainty over whose rules will govern global economic integra-
tion. Disputes between the United States and increasingly powerful states like China 
and India led to a collapse of the Doha Round of negotiations at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In the controversial case of censorship and cyber attacks between 
China and the global corporate giant Google, a representative from the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry warned that Google must adhere to China’s laws and regulations if 
it wants to access the growing Chinese market.1 And in negotiations over contract 
rules for the global cotton sector, global commodity merchants such as Cargill and 
Louis Dreyfus have found themselves in a face-off with the Chinese state over how 
contract rules should be standardized globally. These struggles raise critical questions 
about how transnational governance institutions are constructed as legitimate and 
enforceable on the global stage.
Despite the prominence of such struggles, a key school of thought on transnational 
governance, the global commodity/value chain (GCC/GVC) app roach, largely over-
looks these dynamics. GCC/GVC scholars focus on typifying governance structures 
and forms of coordination in diverse commodity chains and understanding their 
implications for weaker actors’ ability to “upgrade” into more profitable activities. 
As such, GCC/GVC scholars give little attention to how transnational governance 
institutions are constructed to begin with—that is, to the contested processes of 
institution-building.
I explore the idea of commodity chain governance as a contested process of 
institution-building through a study of negotiations over contract rules in the global 
cotton trade. These negotiations offer an interesting case as current dynamics in the 
sector reflect broader geoeconomic and geopolitical tensions. Transnational cotton 
merchants gained significant economic power in the cotton trade from the 1970s to the 
1990s. However, with the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) from 
1995 to 2005 and the accession of China to the WTO in 2001, China burst onto the 
scene as a major player in cotton imports. The case of cotton contract rules thus high-
lights the roles of both private corporations and geopolitical/geoeconomic competition 
in unfolding negotiations over contract rules.
Evidence from this case suggests that understanding processes of institution-building 
within commodity chains requires addressing key weaknesses in the GCC/GVC frame-
work. As a range of scholars have noted, GCC/GVC scholars have largely ignored 
how the broader institutional context in which commodity chains are embedded influ-
ences governance. In this way, they overlook how actors’ interests and relative power 
are constituted in part by existing institutions. Furthermore, GCC/GVC research over-
looks institutional variation across space. As such, GCC/GVC scholars largely see 
governance structures as directly structuring the distribution of profits along a chain 
through the functional division of labor, missing the more subtle competitive advan-
tages gained by convincing others to “play by your rules.” Finally, agency is under-
specified in the GCC/GVC framework. While the GCC approach is based on a view of 
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transnational corporations that “organize” the chain and supplier firms that try to 
“upgrade,” agency in the construction of specific forms of coordination like contracts 
is overlooked.
I address these oversights in order to specify a more dynamic model of commodity 
chain governance that gives attention to how actors strategize and struggle in a com-
petition to inscribe their institutional preferences in new governance forms. In this 
view, actors, and particularly more powerful actors, should be viewed as institutional 
entrepreneurs who cannot automatically govern a commodity chain but rather strategi-
cally construct new governance institutions that reflect their interests and will be accepted 
as legitimate by other actors. At the same time, actors’ interests, strategies, and bargain-
ing power are constituted through their differential embeddedness in existing institu-
tional contexts across space, at various scales, and particularly in dominant, already-global 
institutions.
Through this analysis, I make three central arguments. First, I argue that the nego-
tiation of cotton contract rules was a contest over whose rules would become global 
rules. In the cotton trade, different actors have historically been embedded in distinct 
institutional arrangements governing contracts, including formal versus informal 
rules, private versus state-led rules, and rules governing national, regional, or postco-
lonial trade, each with distinct business practices, customs and understandings of what 
is fair and just. Given this differential embeddedness and the advantages that come 
from playing by your own rules, we see that the most powerful actors—transnational 
merchants and the Chinese state—struggled over whose trade association would gov-
ern global contract rules, while weaker actors struggled against the imposition of 
transnational merchants’ preferred rules.
My second argument is that broader institutional shifts on a global scale play a critical 
role in shaping the power dynamics in sector-specific institution-building. In negotia-
tions over cotton contract rules, the relative bargaining power of transnational merchants 
versus the Chinese state and Chinese textile manufacturers was constituted through 
broader institutional shifts exogenous to the cotton trade itself: the end of the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement; the accession of China to the WTO; and the 1958 New York Convention 
on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The former two shifts constructed China 
as the new powerhouse in cotton imports, giving the Chinese state and Chinese textile 
manufacturers significant power to challenge the conventional trader-driven governance 
structure of the cotton trade. The latter shift, however, gave transnational merchants a 
privileged position in governance negotiations as their preferred, privatized form of con-
tract governance and discourses regarding what makes contract governance fair were 
already institutionalized globally through this inter-state agreement.
Finally, I argue that strategic action within these institutional constraints was criti-
cal to transnational merchants’ efforts to establish global contract rules that would 
both institutionalize their preferences and be accepted as legitimate by other actors. 
Trans national merchants acted as institutional entrepreneurs who retooled their 
existing institutions, gave strategic concessions, and drew on legitimating discourses 
to patch together an institutional arrangement that other actors would accept. Given 
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their differential institutional embeddedness, paired with their shifting competitive-
ness in global markets, weaker actors responded differently to merchants’ proposed 
governance solutions.
Through this study, I attempt to hold together a range of concerns that have been 
raised regarding the GCC/GVC literature. First, I am responding to Bair’s call to 
re-embed GCC/GVC governance in its broader institutional context.2 At the same 
time, I am building upon the Manchester school in economic geography in its attempt 
to bring questions of institutional variation into GCC/GVC research.3 Third, by focus-
ing on institution-building, I respond to Gibbon and Ponte’s call for a better under-
standing of how certain forms of governance emerge in commodity chains.4 Finally, 
I try to take seriously the call to adopt a cultural political economic approach to GCC 
research by giving attention to the critical role of discourse in private governance.5
Governance as a Contested Process  
of Institution-Building
In recent years, a host of “chain” approaches have been widely used to study new 
forms of transnational governance. While emerging from various traditions, most 
prominent in sociological and interdisciplinary research are the global commodity 
chain (GCC) and global value chain (GVC) approaches. Hopkins and Wallerstein first 
introduced the GCC approach as a critique of the methodological nationalism that 
dominated theories of development and economic change.6 Rather than analyzing 
trade among nation-states, it allowed researchers to conceptualize how production and 
distribution processes stretched across national borders.
The research agenda of Gary Gereffi and his associates has been at the center of the 
GCC literature. In the mid-1990s, these scholars emphasized the emergence of private 
governance forms on the global stage. They examined how “lead firms” come to “drive” 
an entire sector by controlling nodes of the commodity chain with high barriers to 
entry7 or, in a later formulation, through the ability to determine the functional division 
of labor on the chain (who does what, using what standards, to which specifications 
and at what price).8 From this type of analysis, Gereffi distinguished between two 
major types of governance structures—producer-driven and buyer-driven.
The producer-driven/buyer-driven distinction aimed to capture the overall power 
structure of a commodity chain. It could not, however, explain how the relationships 
between specific nodes in the chain were coordinated.9 In his later work under the 
auspices of the global value chain (GVC) approach, Gereffi and his associates shifted 
focus to this latter dimension—to delineate different “forms of coordination” within 
commodity chains, or the specific mechanisms through which firms manage “hands-
off” control of supply chains.10 They argue that the coordination of  interfirm transac-
tions is largely determined by asset specificity, or the complexity of transactional 
information and the relative importance of codification in facilitating hands-off 
control.11
By exploring the distinct organizational logics of different commodity chains, the 
GCC/GVC research tradition makes important contributions to our understanding of 
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how new forms of private governance redistribute the benefits of production and dis-
tribution, as well as what opportunities and constraints supplier firms face as they try to 
“upgrade” into more profitable nodes of the chain. However, in doing so, GCC/GVC 
scholars have largely focused on typifying governance structures and forms of coordi-
nation and exploring their effects. They have given little attention to the processes of 
institution-building through which governance structures and forms of coordination 
are constructed and change over time.
Thinking about processes of institution-building rather than just the types and effects 
of transnational governance is critical for three reasons. First, as Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom suggest in their study of environmental certification in the forestry industry, 
“any comparison of existing standards at one point in time misses the fact that rule 
development is not static.”12 This is not to say that such comparisons are not useful but 
that we also need “to understand the processes through which change occurs.”13 
Second, exploring institution building raises the question of legitimacy in private gov-
ernance. As economic sociologists have long noted, institutions of economic gover-
nance, whether private or state-centered, must be enforceable to be effective and 
require a degree of legitimacy, or acceptance by other actors, to be enforceable.14 This 
requires the ability not only to develop new governance forms but to persuade other 
actors to accept and obey them. GCC/GVC scholarship has given little attention to the 
legitimacy of private governance structures and forms of coordination.
Finally, understanding the dynamic process through which legitimate private gover-
nance forms are constructed becomes even more important given current geopolitical 
and geoeconomic shifts. With the decline of U.S. power since 1970, the current period 
is an unsettled era characterized by “uncertainty and unpredictability” in which increas-
ingly powerful firms and states challenge previously dominant ones in a struggle over 
who will inscribe their interests into new institutions that allow expanded accumula-
tion.15 These competitive dynamics have the potential to upset the prevailing gover-
nance structures that GCC/GVC scholars have documented. For example, GCC 
scholars point to Walmart as the quintessential example of Western retailers’ ability to 
consolidate economic and institutional power by “occupying points of leverage” in 
the commodity chain.16 However, Appelbaum argues that in China “giant transna-
tional contractors” are emerging who may be able to challenge “the current seemingly 
unstoppable dominance of giant U.S.- and EU-based retailers as market makers.”17 He 
foresees two possible future trajectories: these giant Chinese contractors could use 
their position as “big suppliers” to challenge Western retailers, turning on its head the 
idea of a buyer-driven chain; alternatively, they could “upgrade” and become powerful 
buyers and retailers themselves. Amid this “cacophony of possible trajectories of 
global change,” it is critical to understand the processes through which actors compete 
to construct governance structures and forms of coordination.18
In order to understand processes of institution-building, we must first address three 
additional critiques of GCC/GVC research. First, and perhaps most widely recognized, 
is the failure of the GCC/GVC framework to consider the broader institutional context in 
which commodity chain governance is embedded.19 While this was a weakness of Gereffi’s 
original GCC framework, this problem has only intensified in the GVC approach.20 In 
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their exploration of “forms of coordination,” Gereffi et al. explicitly exclude broader 
institutional contexts from their analysis in order to focus on variables endogenous to 
the commodity chain: “we feel confident that the variables internal to our model influ-
ence the shape and governance of global value chains in important ways, regardless of 
the institutional context within which they are situated.”21 Yet, a range of scholars has 
demonstrated that existing local, national, and supranational institutional contexts can 
shape private governance.22 For our purposes, rather than assuming its irrelevance, we 
need to assume that the broader institutional context is constitutive of the power 
dynamics within a commodity chain, including which nodes become critical “leverage 
points” from which actors can exert influence over the entire chain. In this view, the 
broader institutional context establishes the terrain of struggle for commodity chain-
specific forms of coordination and governance structures.
A second and related critique has been raised by economic geographers through the 
global production network (GPN) approach: GCC/GVC research does not address 
institutional variation across space. These scholars note that GCC/GVC scholars do 
not engage the vast literature on “varieties of capitalism” that demonstrates the exis-
tence and persistence of distinct institutional forms, including legitimating discourses, 
that stabilize capitalism.23 We need to consider that firms may have distinct interests 
in and pursue different strategies for economic governance given their specific histo-
ries, their cultural practices and worldviews, and the institutional contexts in which 
they are embedded.24 Forms of coordination are never merely neutral, efficient rules. 
Rather, forms of coordination always represent someone’s institutional preference or a 
compromise negotiated amid competing institutional preferences and conflicting 
understandings of what is fair and just. At the same time, forms of coordination do not 
only specify the distribution of profits in a commodity chain. They also structure com-
petitive advantages in more subtle ways by determining who can play by the rules, 
business practices, and cultural understandings with which they are most familiar. 
Understanding how institutional variations converge in the construction of global 
institutions thus means replacing the GCC/GVC’s focus on economic structure with a 
spatialized, cultural political economic approach. We must understand how any form 
of coordination such as a standard or contract is constructed through material and dis-
cursive contestation over whose institutional preferences will prevail.
Finally, the nature of agency in processes of global institution-building is under-
specified in the GCC/GVC framework. Gereffi’s original GCC formulation does stress 
the agency of transnational firms in the construction of private governance structures, 
as transnational firms organize the functional division of labor in a chain in ways that 
allow them to capture the most profits while disciplining suppliers from a distance. 
Other scholars also note the agency of weaker actors, such as suppliers, who attempt 
to change their position in this division of labor by “upgrading.”25 In the later GVC 
approach, however, power and agency fall out of focus. Forms of coordination emerge 
from asset specificity, not through political struggles and strategies.26 Even in the more 
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agency-sensitive GCC version, however, there is little explanation of the processes 
through which legitimate institutions are built.
I suggest that we can revise the GCC/GVC framework to capture processes of 
institution-building by addressing these three weaknesses. This means understanding, 
as Block suggests, that “there are many varieties of capitalism and there are many dif-
ferent ways that these varieties can be articulated together into a global system.”27 As 
such, forms of coordination and the broader governance structure of a commodity chain 
cannot be simply read off the economic structure or the asset specificity of the chain. 
Rather, they should be understood as constructed through competition and strategic 
action that is embedded within existing institutional arrangements across space and at 
various scales.
To this end, we must see transnational firms not simply as “lead” firms by virtue of 
their control of the most profitable nodes of a chain, which has somewhat static con-
notations. While their functional position on the chain is of critical importance, a more 
dynamic view would also conceptualize them as “institutional entrepreneurs.”28 As 
institutional entrepreneurs, transnational firms—and other actors along the commod-
ity chain—work to develop institutional solutions and to mobilize other actors to sup-
port particular institutional arrangements.29 Strategic action is critical as they must 
“creatively recombine and extend the institutional principles at their disposal to devise 
new institutional solutions to their problems.”30 It is through such strategic action that 
actors respond to challenges to their dominance and compete to translate their eco-
nomic power into institutional power.
Institutional entrepreneurs operate within existing institutional arrangements, which 
shape strategic action vis-à-vis transnational governance. In this view, national or 
supranational institutional arrangements are not external to commodity chain gover-
nance but rather are constitutive of actors’ interests and strategies in governance nego-
tiations. Actors in commodity chains—including transnational firms—are not 
“placeless” entities that merely choose the most efficient solutions to their institutional 
problems. Rather, they are embedded in a wide array of existing institutional struc-
tures, such as state institutions, private associations, informal customs, cultural styles 
of doing business, and legitimating discourses. Actors struggle to have their institu-
tional preferences inscribed into transnational governance arrangements. To achieve 
this, they reflexively retool institutional technologies and reconstruct discourses to 
legitimate their institutional preferences as appropriate, efficient, and even fair. At the 
same time, other actors evaluate new governance arrangements and accept or reject 
them based on their own embeddedness in existing institutions. In this view, which 
firms will successfully institutionalize their interests into new private governance 
arrangements is a critical axis of struggle.
Actors, of course, are not equal in these interactions. Understanding power inequali-
ties in commodity chain governance is a central contribution of the GCC literature. 
However, GCC scholars tend to put economic power at the center of their analyses. As 
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such, they underemphasize the ways in which actors’ power is embedded in and con-
structed through dominant institutions. Institutional shifts exogenous to the com-
modity chain itself can significantly reconfigure power relations within the chain. For 
example, the shift to “free trade” governance in the apparel sector through the end of 
the MFA and the accession of China to the WTO radically reconstituted the power 
dynamics in the cotton trade, making China the new power player.
Also critical for transnational governance negotiations are the power relations 
inscribed in what Santos would call already “globalized localisms.”31 The institutional 
preferences of some actors—particularly Western, transnational firms—have already 
been institutionalized at the global scale within international organizations and inter-
state agreements. These actors thus have an advantage in their efforts to further inscribe 
these preferences into commodity chain governance. For example, we will see that, 
while cotton merchants had to persuade other actors to accept their contract rules as 
legitimate, they enjoyed privileges in this struggle as their preferred, private form of 
contract governance and their discourses about what makes contract governance “fair” 
had already been institutionalized on the global scale.
In short, we must more carefully trace how strategic action, existing institutions, 
and dominant discourses all intersect on a terrain of uneven power relations in the 
construction of private governance. This perspective provides a more dynamic view of 
governance by focusing on how actors construct legitimate institutions in ways that 
will serve their interests, but in the context of institutional constraints, many of which 
are exogenous to the commodity chain itself. This is not to deny that constraints such 
as asset specificity are important. Rather, it suggests that such variables endogenous to 
commodity chains are not sufficient to explain the forms of coordination that govern 
interfirm transactions, how they emerge, and how they change over time.
Method
I collected and analyzed three types of data using the GCC approach to identify key 
interviewees and research sites. First, I conducted document analysis of news arti-
cles, annual reports, minutes from meetings, and policy documents. Second, I analyzed 
statistics on changes in global cotton production, consumption, and trade from 1970 
to present from a dataset I obtained from the International Cotton Advisory Committee 
(ICAC). Finally, I utilized a multisited ethnographic research strategy. This involved 
conducting approximately eighty semi-structured interviews with cotton merchants, 
textile manufacturers, state representatives, and trade association representatives. 
I conducted these interviews during field visits to China, Benin, Brazil, Britain, and 
the United States, as well as during four international cotton industry meetings that 
I attended: the 2005 and 2006 annual meetings of the ICAC and the 2005 and 2006 
annual meetings of the International Cotton Association (ICA). These conferences 
brought together state and private sector representatives from cotton producing and 
consuming countries around the world.
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Contract Rules and the  
Structure of the Cotton Trade
Contract rules are an economic governance form that enables “actors in markets to 
organize themselves, to compete and cooperate, and to exchange.”32 Standardized con-
tract rules reduce the transaction costs of trade by providing mutual expectations for 
buyers and sellers. Standard contract rules govern almost the entire market for bulk 
commodities, as well as for the air and sea transport, construction, and finance sectors.33
A contract in the cotton trade is an agreement between two or more actors to buy 
and sell a particular quantity and quality of cotton. Individual contracts can be made in 
isolation from any formal set of rules (although customs and common practices always 
inform contracts). In general, however, contracts for trading cotton are negotiated in 
relation to contract rules, or a formalized set of norms outlining common terms of 
exchange and procedures for settling disputes. Contract rules define the roles and 
responsibilities that actors assume when carrying out a transaction, such as who will 
be responsible for storage, transportation, and insurance; how payment will be made; 
what quality of cotton is being bought/sold and who will verify its quality; and who 
will settle disputes, the process through which they will be settled, and how they will 
be enforced.
To understand negotiations over contract rules as a contested process, it is useful to 
first understand how the cotton trade is organized and the key players involved. Figure 1 
provides a snapshot of how the cotton trade is currently organized and embedded within 
the broader apparel/textile commodity chain. The apparel commodity chain is held up 
as a key example of Gereffi’s buyer-driven commodity chain. However, if we follow 
the chain to its roots in raw material provision, which is rarely done, we discover a 
range of other actors—such as merchants and cotton producers—that are typically 
excluded from the discussion. Gibbon has called the raw material portion a “trader-
driven” chain.34 The lead firms in this case are transnational merchants who gain dom-
inance in three ways: by globally sourcing commodities to supply other firms, by their 
command of huge volumes of information from all producing and consuming regions, 
and by their access to capital and expertise in commodity futures markets.35 However, 
just as Gereffi fails to consider raw material provision in the apparel commodity chain, 
Gibbon does not account for how raw material supply chains funnel into other com-
modity chains for finished goods.
Talbot suggests that, to overcome this issue, we might best understand most chains 
as divided into a few segments, each having their own governance structures.36 From 
this view, we can conceptualize the cotton trade as being “driven” by transnational 
merchants while, at the same time, it funnels into the buyer-driven apparel segment. 
Important here is the fact that these different segments can overlap and conflict.37 Gov-
ernance shifts in the apparel segment, for example, can have significant implications 
for negotiations over forms of coordination—and the broader governance structure—
of the cotton segment, as we will see in the implications of the end of the MFA. Indeed, 
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the way in which the governance structures of different segments of chains overlap is 
a key source of dynamism in commodity chain governance.
Cotton is grown in more than eighty countries; however, a much smaller number 
play a significant role in the transnational trade. In fact, the largest exporting countries—
the United States, India, Uzbekistan, the CFA zone bloc of producing countries,38 
Australia, and Brazil—account for approximately 75 percent of all exports.39 Spinning 
mills in more than one hundred countries consume cotton, but again a smaller number 
of countries are major players in imports, and, recently, China has come to dominate. 
In the 2007/2008 season, China accounted for approximately 36 percent of all cotton 
imports (see Figure 2). The next largest importers that year accounted for much smaller 
import shares: Turkey (9.7 percent), Pakistan (7.6 percent), Bangladesh (5.9 percent), 
and Indonesia (5.3 percent).40
Branded Marketers/
Retailers
(sales, design, logistics)
Textile Manufacturers
(weave, knit, finish)
Apparel Manufacturers
(assemble garments)
Spinners
(spin fiber into yarn)
Merchants
(private/state/cooperative)
(buy and sell)
Ginners
(separate fibers from seeds)
Producers
(cultivate cotton)
Input Suppliers
(seed/chemical sales, public
and private plant breeders)
The Cotton
Trade
Often vertically
integrated, therefore,
will be referred to
collectively as
textile manufacturers
Producers often
maintain ownership
of cotton fiber after
ginning and sell to
merchants
Figure 1. The cotton trade within the apparel/textile commodity chain 
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Linking cotton-producing countries with cotton-consuming countries are the mer-
chants who have come to “drive” the chain in recent decades. There are thousands of 
local merchants and hundreds of regional merchants. These smaller firms generally 
sell cotton purchased locally to transnational merchants who will organize a transna-
tional sale. A small number of merchants conduct the transnational trade. While precise 
data on market share are difficult to obtain, by the early 2000s, about ten companies 
handled more than two-thirds of the transnational trade in cotton.41 Industry players, 
however, suggest that actual consolidation is likely higher; the largest three firms may 
handle as much as 45% of the transnational trade.
It is these actors that are involved in negotiations over contract rules. However, they 
come to negotiations from varied institutional backgrounds. Private companies handle 
most transnational trade. Private firms generally belong to trade associations in which 
contract rules are negotiated. In Western countries, private firms and trade associations 
have a long history of negotiating contract rules, as we will see in the next section. In 
many countries in the global South, in contrast, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) con-
trolled imports and exports of cotton in the postwar period, including in China, India, 
Pakistan, Egypt, and the cotton-producing countries of the CFA zone. These SOEs 
negotiated contract terms for, and settled disputes over, cotton exports or imports on 
behalf of cotton producers or textile manufacturers. While some have been accused of 
corruption, SOEs provided a counterweight in negotiations with transnational 
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merchants, giving cotton producers and textile manufacturers bargaining power that 
they could not exercise alone. Some of these SOEs continue to operate, while others 
have been privatized through structural adjustment programs and neoliberal reforms.42 
In the wake of SOE privatization, private actors in a number of countries have created 
private trade associations to negotiate new, nationally focused contract rules (see Table 
1). It is from this mixed landscape of public and (in some cases, newly) private rules, 
focused on national or postcolonial trade networks and rooted in national legal sys-
tems, that actors are now negotiating global contract rules.
The History of Anglo-American Contract Rules
While it could be analytically useful to explore the history of contract rules in any coun-
try involved in the cotton trade, it is worth giving attention to the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, given its institutionalization in the global arena and thus its particular imp ortance 
for negotiations around global contract rules. Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in the United States and Britain, contract rules have represented a relatively 
privatized governance form, rooted in the notions of freedom of contract and contract 
sanctity.43 Through freedom of contract, states give private enterprises the right to 
Table 1. Cotton Trade Associations 2009*
Name Country
Alexandria Cotton Exporters Association Egypt
American Cotton Shippers Association (1924) United States
Association Cotonnière Africaine (2002) Regional
Association Cotonnière de Belgique Belgium
Association Française Cotonnière (1895—estimate) France
Associazione Cotoniera Italiana (1883) Italy
Australian Cotton Shippers Association Australia
Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros (1917) Brazil
Bremer Baumwollbörse (1872) Germany
Centro Algodonero Nacional (1887) Spain
China Cotton Association China
Cotton Association of India (1922) India
Gdynia Cotton Association (1938) Poland
Izmir Mercantile Exchange Turkey
Japan Cotton Traders Association Japan
The Karachi Cotton Association (1933) Pakistan
The Liverpool Cotton Association (1882) UK
*These associations are members of the Committee for International Cooperation between Cotton 
Associations (CICCA).
Source: Committee for International Cooperation between Cotton Associations, “CICCA,” http://www 
.cicca.info/ (accessed April 2, 2009).
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enter into binding contracts and to define their contractual relationships individually 
or through standard sectoral rules governed by private trade associations. Moreover, 
firms are allowed to settle their own disputes through private arbitral bodies operating 
independently of state courts. Through contract sanctity, states agree to enforce pri-
vate contracts and the decisions of private arbitral bodies, as long as they follow the 
limits and procedures of national laws.44 This governance form maximizes the auton-
omous authority of firms, strengthens the enforceability of private authority, and mini-
mizes the scope for state intervention.
In the postwar period, Western states and firms, led by the United States, attempted 
to extend this form of contract governance onto the global stage to better facilitate 
transnational trade. Trade associations in Western countries had developed contract 
rules that were largely domestically focused, based on national legal systems, which 
meant their jurisdiction was limited to the jurisdiction of national state courts. At the 
same time, struggles for decolonization were creating newly independent nation-states—
and trade with former colonies based on consent rather than sheer coercion—but there 
were no legitimate rules to govern this trade. In this context, Western states negotiated 
the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, also known as the 1958 New York Convention. Based on this Con-
vention, firms can contractually bind themselves to settle disputes in a particular state 
court or through a particular private arbitral body.45 By ratifying the Convention, states 
agreed to enforce the decisions of both other state courts and private arbitral bodies 
without subjecting them to domestic rules and procedures, unless they contradicted 
public policy, which was vaguely defined.
Through the 1958 New York Convention, the Anglo-American tradition of contract 
governance became a “globalized localism” that constructed the power of private firms 
to negotiate contract rules and settle their own disputes on a global stage. Importantly, 
the 1958 New York Convention also institutionalized and globalized a particular dis-
course about what made contract rules “fair” that had emerged in relation to economic 
liberalism in the nineteenth century. This is the notion that contractual obligations are 
consensual and derive from the voluntary agreement of the parties to a contract.46 From 
this view, contracts are to be viewed as expressing the wills and desires of individuals, 
and “the law was not to police the equity of the bargain.”47 Although this global insti-
tutional infrastructure was put in place in the immediate postwar period, many sectors—
the cotton trade included—did not begin the process of transnational standardization 
until much later.48
Transnational Merchants, China, and the Rivalry  
for Institutional Power in the Cotton Trade
Transnational cotton merchants consolidated economic power within the cotton trade 
from the 1970s to the 1990s. While the cotton trade has always been relatively global, 
its global reach expanded significantly as textile firms in Asia outcompeted those in 
Western countries (see Figure 2). To meet this new demand, domestic-oriented cotton 
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producers such as those in the United States became exporters, and new cotton export-
ers emerged in a number of “developing” countries, such as Uzbekistan and countries 
in CFA zone (see Figure 3). U.S. and European cotton merchants were positioned to 
capture the most benefits given their position as powerful middlemen between rela-
tively small and geographically dispersed cotton producers and textile mills around the 
world.
Transnational cotton merchants expanded rapidly despite the lack of globally stan-
dardized contract rules to govern their transactions. The lack of standardized contract 
rules did pose a problem for merchants given the inability of many of their trade part-
ners to manage price risk. Many trade partners in developing countries did not (and do 
not) have access to or the skills to use price risk-management tools such as futures 
markets. If actors could not hedge their price risks, they would be much more likely to 
default on contracts in the case of significant price fluctuations, as evidenced in the 
“cotton contract crisis” of the 1970s.49 Despite these problems, efforts to standardize 
transnational contract rules were overshadowed by new opportunities to gain a com-
petitive advantage in a global market without clearly defined rules. Merchants com-
peted to be reliable suppliers with the ability to absorb price risks and to secure reliable 
clients who could do the same without defaulting on their contracts. Moreover, as they 
grew in power vis-à-vis their clients, transnational merchants found themselves in a 
favorable position to largely impose their contract rules—the rules of the Liverpool 
Cotton Association (LCA)—on clients.
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However, the seemingly unrivalled power of transnational merchants faced a signifi-
cant challenge with a radical shift in the power structure of the cotton market in the early 
2000s. Through negotiations over the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) at the 
WTO, states decided to move from the protectionist quota-system regulation of the 
apparel sector by the MFA to neoliberal “free trade” governance. As quotas on apparel 
were phased out, ending completely in 2005, retailers and branded marketers were able 
to source apparel from firms in whichever country could offer the lowest prices. With its 
accession to the WTO in 2001, China was by far the biggest winner as a result of the end 
of quotas. In the course of a few years, China became the largest producer of textiles and 
apparel—and thus the largest importer of cotton—in the world. China’s share of world 
cotton imports jumped from 15 percent to 40 percent (see Figure 4).
The radical increase in China’s market share reconfigured competitive tensions in 
the cotton trade and thus the incentives for standardizing rules. The significant market 
share wielded by Chinese spinning firms after the MFA meant that merchants had 
more to lose from widespread contract defaults in the Chinese market. When prices 
fluctuated dramatically in 2004, for example, many Chinese spinning firms defaulted 
on their contracts as they could not absorb the price loss and remain competitive. This 
resulted in significant losses for transnational merchants:
We had a really bad experience in China. . . . We had sold a lot of cotton on pretty 
good terms—high prices. But then the market dropped and prices fell in half—
a 20 to 30 cent drop. And we had a lot of bales in these contracts. And the Chinese 
mills started defaulting on all these contracts. . . . This was a huge hit—we’re 
talking millions and millions and millions of dollars. (Top 3 cotton merchant)
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Historically, sanctity of contract did not present a problem in China as contracts were 
publicly regulated by the country’s state-owned enterprise (SOE), the China National 
Textiles Import and Export Corporation (Chinatex), thus ensuring sanctity of contract. 
However, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 required a range of neoliberal policy 
reforms, including the privatization of Chinatex including a requirement to allow pri-
vate firms to import cotton. Merchants faced an import market comprised of six thou-
sand to ten thousand diverse spinning firms. Some of these spinning firms were large, 
indeed, the largest in the world, with vertically integrated textile manufacturing opera-
tions run by foreign investors or Chinese nationals with broad business experience. 
Many others, however, were small firms with no experience importing cotton or using 
transnational contracts, and no experience with or access to price risk-management 
tools, which were underdeveloped in China at this time.
The problems associated with contract defaults in the Chinese market were intensi-
fied given the different legal norms that operated in China. The Chinese state had rati-
fied the 1958 New York Convention; however, as in many developing countries, 
Chinese state courts did not necessarily enforce private arbitral decisions as per the 
Convention but rather reopened cases based on the public policy clause. For example, 
one transnational merchant reported that he took an arbitral award to a Chinese court to 
have it enforced when the spinning firm refused to pay. The judge decided not to enforce 
the award to avoid bankrupting the offending spinning firm and leaving hundreds of 
community members jobless as a result. The Chinese legal system was highly embed-
ded in guanxi, or networks of personal connections. Such situations intensified mer-
chants’ interest in creating standardized contract rules that were enforceable in China.
At the same time as merchants’ interest in standardization intensified, the Chinese 
state recognized that contract sanctity was linked to the textile sector’s profitability 
vis-à-vis other countries. Without price risk-management tools, spinning firms needed 
a good reputation for reliable payment and contract sanctity so that merchants would 
offer them on-call pricing, or, in other words, extend them credit for a window of time 
during which they could watch price fluctuations and “call” the best price. If spinning 
firms could not use on-call pricing, they risked paying more for cotton if prices increased, 
as a service provider to merchants explained:
About three years ago, there was a price hike of 20 cents per pound. This ended 
up making Chinese yarns more expensive than Indonesian yarns because Indonesia 
could use on-call prices and Chinese buyers couldn’t as no one trusted them or 
Chinese arbitration enough to extend them credit. So China was paying 20 cents 
a pound more for cotton on a spot market while the Indonesian spinners could 
wait for the price to fall again.
Chinese spinning firms’ global competitiveness was reliant on a reputation for con-
tract sanctity. Moreover, the competitiveness of the textile and apparel sectors was 
critical to Chinese national development overall given the jobs these sectors created.
Far from unrivalled in the construction of private contract rules for the global cot-
ton trade, transnational cotton merchants faced a formidable bargaining foe. The 
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Chinese state wanted contract rules that would sharpen the competitiveness of these 
sectors, and this meant challenging rather than accepting the rules of the transnational 
merchants’ trade association, the LCA. Like many industry players around the world, 
the Chinese state considered the LCA rules to be trader-biased—developed by, and in 
the interests of, transnational merchants. One of the LCA’s arbitrators explained this 
perception: “It’s because they are trader-biased! But others could come and join our 
organization and change them.” The Chinese state could not, however, continue to 
govern contract rules directly, given the privatization of Chinatex. Instead, as in other 
industries, in 2006 the state established a trade association—the China Cotton Association 
(CCA)—that was related to the state through a “state corporatist relationship.”50 The 
CCA would develop a standard contract that would serve as an “industry best practices” 
model for their inexperienced spinning firms.
Given their significant dependence on transnational merchants, the CCA decided 
that the merchants’ trade association, the LCA, could negotiate with them over the 
standard contract. Merchants preferred to negotiate from the starting point of the LCA 
rules rather than the CCA rules. Whose rules mattered, as the LCA and the CCA were 
not merely negotiating over the content of the rules. Contract rules were embedded in 
trade associations that would oversee these rules in the future and would make deci-
sions regarding how rules should change and be interpreted. From this perspective, the 
trade association under which negotiations would unfold could have implications for 
who would have authority over rules in the future. Despite this less than ideal situation 
for merchants, the LCA agreed to negotiate—any rules were better than no rules, at 
least in the short term.
Two issues were particularly contentious in negotiations. First, as the 1958 New York 
Convention allowed transacting parties to settle disputes through private arbitral bod-
ies instead of state courts, a central point of contention was over whose arbitral body 
would settle contract disputes. The merchants wanted to name the LCA as the arbitral 
authority, while the CCA wanted disputes arbitrated by the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). As sociolegal scholars 
argue, which private arbitral body settles disputes matters, as they can vary signifi-
cantly based on their historical development in relation to the domestic legal profes-
sions, arbitral practices, and legal systems of particular countries and/or sectors.51 
Different arbitral bodies and arbitrators have different conceptions of what arbitration 
should look like and how it should operate. Therefore, which arbitral body is used 
determines who is “able to play by their own terms.”52 The LCA, for example, was 
steeped in the private rules, norms, and culture of the transnational cotton merchant 
community, had developed out of the Anglo-American arbitration tradition and legal 
systems, and was developed to address the technical specificities of the cotton trade. 
CIETAC, in contrast, was developed in relation to the legal rules and cultural norms 
in China and conducted arbitration for commercial disputes across a range of sec-
tors. Santos suggests that, by demanding use of its arbitral body in disputes in a 
number of sectors, the Chinese state and Chinese firms are trying to impose some of 
the particularistic qualities of Chinese capitalism and Chinese modernization on pri-
vate arbitration practices.53
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The second highly contentious issue was the quality terms of the contract. Cotton 
contracts commonly include a quality penalty, which dictates the penalty to be paid per 
bale if the quality of the shipment is found to be below the quality range stated in the 
contract. Merchants aim to keep this penalty low as they have historically made money 
by agreeing to a certain quality range but then shipping in the bottom end of the range 
or including a few subquality bales. Also, merchants assume the risk that the quality of 
bales could change during transport due to improper storage or water damage. Spinning 
firms, on the other hand, desire high-quality penalties, as the quality of their yarn 
depends on receiving the cotton quality that they purchased, and they generally pro-
duce yarn to meet the quality specifications of a particular sales contract. To ensure the 
interests of the Chinese textile sector, the CCA wanted high-quality penalties.54 From 
the perspective of the transnational merchants who trade millions of bales a year, this 
was an unreasonable demand. As one vice president explains: “There are huge pen-
alty differences [between the CCA contract and the LCA contract]. $30 per bale vs. 
$3 dollars per bale!”
After tense negotiations, the CCA and the LCA came to a compromise on arbitra-
tion. The CCA agreed to allow parties to choose either CIETAC or LCA arbitration. 
However, the CCA refused to compromise on quality terms in the official version of 
the contract. In so doing, the CCA essentially declared a stalemate in efforts to develop 
standardized contract rules.
The Need for Legitimate  
Cotton Contract Rules
The CCA’s challenge compelled transnational cotton merchants to pursue new strate-
gies in order to ensure their future economic and institutional power in the cotton 
sector. Not only were transnational merchants dissatisfied with the official rules that 
the CCA ultimately released, they were also concerned that these rules favoring textile 
manufacturers would become the foundation for a broader standardization of contract 
rules for the global cotton trade. Given this threat, the LCA decided to solidify its 
leadership in the sector. Specifically, the LCA proposed that private trade associations 
representing merchants and textile manufacturers around the world should adopt the 
LCA contract rules as the global rules governing cotton contracts (see Table 1). It cast 
its proposal as representing the general interest of the “cotton community” as a whole, 
as the president of the ICA explained:
China is now a Member of the WTO and by the end of the year 2005 is likely 
to represent close to 40 percent of the world’s cotton consumption. . . . It is time 
now to work closely with our Chinese friends on the issue of cotton trade rules 
in China. . . . History has shown that wherever there is not a clear understanding 
of rules, disputes are much more likely to occur. It will be in the interest of the 
entire world to make sure that this clear understanding is in place.55
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LCA officials urged others in the industry to “take up the call for further growth in trade 
through standardization.”56 They hoped that standardization around their rules in the 
sector as a whole would give them greater bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the CCA. At this 
time, the CCA was not a member of the key international cotton organizations, such 
as the Committee for International Cooperation among Cotton Associations (CICCA), 
due to Taiwan’s participation.
Other cotton trade associations, however, echoed the CCA’s critiques that the LCA 
rules were trader-biased and thus were reluctant to replace their own rules and proce-
dures with those of the LCA. Textile manufacturers in Turkey and Bangladesh, for 
example, raised concerns about a range of rules which they perceived as protecting mer-
chants more than spinners, including the rules for delay in shipment, quality complaints, 
and sellers’ late payment of claims for weight and quality.57 A number of textile manu-
facturers also considered LCA procedures for arbitrating contract disputes to be biased. 
The LCA rules, like the rules of the European cotton associations, specified a practice 
called “invoicing back,” which tried to resolve disputes by returning transacting parties 
to the same situation they would be in if the contract had been fulfilled normally. In both 
the LCA rules and those of the continental European trade associations, for example, if 
a merchant did not deliver cotton to a textile manufacturer as specified in a contract, the 
merchant would have to repay any money that the textile manufacturer had already paid 
for the shipment, plus the difference between the price stated in the contract and the spot 
market price at the time of default, which would allow the textile manufacturer to pur-
chase cotton to replace the portion that was not delivered.
The LCA rules on invoicing back, however, diverged from the rules of the European 
trade associations in key respects. First, the LCA rules did not allow aggrieved parties 
to claim additional damages related to a contract default. An LCA official explained: 
“LCA rules don’t address consequential costs or losses. Like if the cotton doesn’t 
arrive, what additional costs this creates for spinners.” Losses or costs incurred as a 
result of the contract nonperformance could not be claimed, unless the parties added 
specific additional contract terms that deemed specific consequential costs recover-
able.58 Moreover, the LCA had what was considered an adversarial arbitration system, 
or a “hired gun” system, in which each party to the dispute paid an arbitrator and a 
two-person panel decided the outcome. The end result was thus significantly influ-
enced by parties who could compensate the best arbitrator; countries in the global 
South felt this put them at a significant disadvantage because arbitrators could charge 
between 75 to 150 GBP per hour (approx. $150 to $300USD).59
Trade associations were also skeptical of the biased authority structure of the 
LCA. The LCA wanted to claim global authority, yet its executive board, its key 
decision-making committees, and its membership in general did not represent the 
diversity of actors in the global cotton trade. The LCA was largely a trade associa-
tion of Western-based merchants, and the majority of the organization’s officers, as 
well as officially recognized arbitrators, were U.S. and British merchants and spe-
cialized arbitration firms.
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The resistance to the LCA rules was not resistance to global standardization per se. 
Rather, textile manufacturers and domestic merchants in other trade associations simply 
had different interests in what global rules should be, given their historical embedded-
ness in different contract governance institutions. In this context, different trade asso-
ciations responded differently to the LCA’s standardization proposal, depending on 
their different positions in the sector. The continental European trade associations and 
cotton exchanges,60 for example, had developed their own contract rules and arbitral 
bodies in the late 1800s and early 1900s to govern cotton imports. The European asso-
ciations were adept at using their own rules and procedures to secure advantages in 
contracts and arbitration and were not interested in adopting the ICA rules. At the same 
time, however, the European textile industries had declined precipitously in recent 
decades (see Figure 5), and their trade associations were attempting to stave off their 
decline in both market share and influence within the transnational cotton trade (see 
Figure 6). In 1999, the seven European cotton trade associations, including the LCA, 
had formed the European Cotton Confederation (ECC) to promote greater cooperation 
in the European industry.61 When the LCA proposed the adoption of its rules, the 
remaining members of the ECC decided instead to negotiate standard European rules 
for cotton contracts and arbitration, in part due to the commonalities between the 
contract rules and arbitration procedures based in the continental European civil law 
tradition versus the Anglo-American common law tradition. The ECC thus launched a 
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competing effort to construct standardized contract rules, contesting whose association 
should lead global standardization.
For textile manufacturers and domestic merchants in many other countries, adop-
tion of the LCA rules would reflect a much more profound shift in contract gover-
nance. Like in China, many states in developing countries had established state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to import and export cotton in the postwar period, including India, 
Pakistan, Egypt, and the cotton-producing countries in the CFA zone. From the 1980s 
to the 2000s, however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—and later the WTO—
pushed for the privatization of SOEs in cotton and other sectors, citing them as inef-
ficient and/or barriers to free trade. In the newly privatized environment, however, 
textile manufacturers, domestic merchants, and cotton producers in these countries 
were inexperienced and faced a cadre of powerful transnational merchants who wanted 
to impose their rules and arbitral procedures. In this context, many actors in develop-
ing countries had little choice but to accept LCA rules and arbitration in their con-
tracts. Trade associations in developing countries were thus reluctant to formally adopt 
the LCA rules.
Some of the most vocal protests came from textile manufacturers and merchants in 
the Indian cotton industry, who argued that the fact that there were only a few large 
transnational traders and thousands of small spinners in India put them at a bargaining 
disadvantage.62 This is what also drove Indian firms to contest LCA arbitral decisions 
in state courts—a practice that transnational merchants were hoping to eliminate. Like 
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firms in other developing countries, Indian firms saw state courts as places to turn when 
more powerful transnational merchants forced them into unfair deals.
Unwilling to adopt what they saw as biased LCA rules and arbitration procedures, 
Indian buyers and textile manufacturers adopted a different strategy. They developed 
a standard contract for importing cotton to India.63 These were nationally focused rules 
that Indian firms wanted to use for imports and exports from India to offset what they 
saw as their significant bargaining disadvantage in the global market. The LCA was 
not pleased with this development. As an LCA official explained:
A few years back when we started the standardization [of contract rules], India 
appeared to be a real threat as they didn’t want to adopt the LCA rules. They 
thought the LCA rules represented Western companies and Western power try-
ing to impose on them and dominate them. They didn’t want to accept them. 
They wanted to use Indian law and Indian arbitration.
Ultimately, however, the LCA largely dismissed the Indian associations’ protests. 
At this time, India was still a relatively small player in the transnational trade. While 
transnational merchants had suffered losses due to contract defaults in the Indian mar-
ket, they were not about to use the Indian standard contract or negotiate on the Indian 
industry’s terms.
Constructing Legitimacy over Contract Rules, 
Creating Opportunities for Weaker Actors
Amid these criticisms of the LCA as a biased institution that did not represent the 
interests of diverse constituencies in the transnational cotton trade, the LCA realized 
that if it wanted to use standardization to gain leverage vis-à-vis the CCA, it would 
need to establish leadership more through consent than coercion. To this end, the LCA 
decided to launch a campaign to construct hegemony: (1) by changing key rules to 
gain weaker actors’ consent; (2) by discursively framing LCA rules as “ethical” busi-
ness practices; and (3) by making its authority structure more representative. The LCA 
hoped that these efforts would persuade other trade associations to join the LCA, 
ultimately bolstering its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese state. For other trade 
associations, the LCA’s bid for hegemony created new opportunities to have their 
voices heard. Depending on their competitive positions, different trade associations 
would choose to adopt or resist the LCA rules in attempts to gain relatively greater 
institutional power over contract rules into the future.
The LCA’s first strategy was to evaluate and revise their rules in order to claim 
their impartiality. The LCA compared its rules and procedures with those of other 
private trade associations and arbitral bodies, such as the Sugar Association and the 
Grain and Feeds Trade Association. Further, it invited the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators to provide an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of its arbitration 
procedures in comparison to other UK-based trade associations. Based on these 
evaluations, one of the key changes made was to its arbitration practices. The LCA 
Quark 25
decided to replace its adversarial arbitration system with a tribunal system, more 
similar to the one used in the continental European trade associations. In the new 
tribunal system, each party would still appoint and pay an arbitrator, but the LCA 
would also appoint a chairperson to each arbitration panel. This chairperson would 
manage the arbitration and would have the final vote on the arbitral award. In addition, 
any and all payments for arbitration would have to be made through the ICA Secretariat 
to ensure transparency.64
The LCA was not willing, however, to change its controversial invoicing back 
rules. Instead, it made a strategic interim concession to other trade associations. The 
LCA announced that it would allow trade associations to adopt the LCA rules without 
adopting LCA arbitration. This meant that industry players would write their contracts 
according to LCA rules but, in the case of a dispute, they would settle it using the 
procedures of their national trade association. This represented a significant—but 
strategic—concession. By letting cotton associations keep arbitration within their own 
associations, transnational merchants put aside for the time being their goal of estab-
lishing the LCA as the authoritative arbitral body for the industry. In this way, it would 
keep continued conflict over LCA arbitration procedures—and the failure to link 
blame with breach of contract—from halting all standardization efforts. At the same 
time, it would achieve perhaps a more important goal: constructing broader support for 
private arbitration and enforcement outside of state courts. When transnational mer-
chants had pushed clients to use LCA arbitration, they had responded by turning to 
state courts when disputes arose. Allowing members of other trade associations to use 
their own arbitral bodies meant that transnational merchants would have to loosen 
their control over arbitration but would increase the acceptance of private arbitration 
and enforcement. If actors were using their own arbitration bodies and procedures, they 
would be more likely to respond to private enforcement mechanisms like blacklists 
and less likely to challenge arbitral decisions in state courts.
The LCA’s second strategy was to use these rule changes as the basis of a discursive 
campaign to claim its impartiality and thus its legitimate leadership in the standardiza-
tion of global contract rules. To launch this effort, in 2004 the LCA re-branded itself 
as the ICA, the International Cotton Association. The president of the new ICA declared: 
“By altering our name we are making a statement to the world. We are the internation-
ally recognized arbitral body for cotton.”65 The ICA argued that for members of the 
“cotton community” to benefit from expanding global trade, the cotton trade had to be 
based on “ethical” trading practices. From the ICA’s perspective, those who upheld 
contract sanctity were ethical businesspeople, while those who defaulted on contracts 
were not. The ICA argued that adopting its rules, as well as the blacklist as a private 
enforcement mechanism, was:
. . . for your own protection. It serves us nothing if our competitors do not obey 
the rules, and attempt to seek some advantage over the honest guys. The respon-
sibility of enforcement is not the Association’s, it is yours, it must be the collec-
tive effort of all of us, to ensure that those who do not take our rules seriously, 
find themselves isolated.66
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This construction of “ethical” business practices, however, was biased toward larger 
players who had access to and the expertise to use price risk-management tools (such 
as hedging in futures markets), and thus could manage their risk without resorting to 
contract defaults.
Through this “you’re-with-us-or-against-us” mentality, the ICA argued that the 
adoption of the ICA rules represented the solution to the lack of common, ethical con-
tract rules for the global cotton trade. The president of the ICA insisted:
The world needs one major trade body and one international set of rules. . . . The 
[ICA’s] new rules for arbitration create an open transparency within our system 
and it will be extremely hard to argue against the impartiality of the [ICA] now 
that this has been created. . . . I also believe that the new rules . . . will help to 
address any misconceived perceptions that the [ICA] is not a completely fair 
and impartial body.67
In this way, the ICA aimed to distinguish its own neutrality and impartiality with the 
unfairness of other potential solutions, such as using nationally focused rules that rep-
resented the narrow interests of only some actors.68
To promote this message, the ICA launched an educational campaign to familiarize 
textile manufacturers and merchants, particularly in developing countries, with the 
newly revised ICA rules. The ICA posted the new rules, a guidebook, and a standard 
model contract on its website and translated the ICA rules into four languages in addition 
to English: French, Portuguese, Russian, and Mandarin.69 Moreover, from 2006 to 2009, 
subsequent presidents, the director general, and other ICA members held interactive 
workshops and presentations in China, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Australia, 
Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Geneva, Tanzania, Brazil, and the United States.70
Finally, the ICA tackled concerns that its authority structure was unrepresentative 
by diversifying its directorships, its network of arbitrators, and its Rules Committee. 
In addition to its officers and ordinary directors, the ICA added a new category of 
associate directors, who would be “especially appointed to represent the interests and 
concerns of international members of the ICA and the principal overseas cotton pro-
ducing and consuming regions.”71 By 2007, the ICA had appointed associate directors 
to represent the African Cotton Association, the Indonesian Textile Industry, the Pakistan 
Cotton Textile Industry, the Turkish Cotton Industry, the Australian Cotton Industry, 
the Committee for International Cooperation among Cotton Associations (CICCA), and 
the International Textiles Manufacturers Federation (ITMF).72
The ICA further initiated a training program to globalize its network of arbitrators. 
While this meant decentralizing control over arbitration processes, an ICA representa-
tive explained its rationale:
The ICA is encouraging more overseas arbitrators. Right now, more than half of 
arbitrators are UK-based. But we need arbitrators in China, in India. We’ve got 
to do it, there is no choice really. We need the credibility. . . . If we can certify 
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arbitrators across the world, then people aren’t so against it just being some 
decision coming down from Liverpool. But they can say, I’ve got my own guy 
here, my ICA arbitrator in my own country who speaks my language. And then 
my arbitration panel might have someone from Brazil on it and an independent 
person appointed by the ICA—so you’d really feel like you were getting an 
unbiased opinion.
In October 2006 at their annual meetings, the ICA held the first-ever examination to 
become a certified ICA arbitrator. In the first seven months, thirty-one members, from 
the United Kingdom, the United States, Switzerland, Germany, China, Singapore, and 
Belgium, passed the Level 1 Arbitrator Training Course exam; twenty more were sched-
uled to take the exam by the end of 2007.73
In perhaps its most significant concession to establish greater representation, the 
ICA decided to strategically diversify its Rules Committee. At its annual meeting in 
2006, it announced that every trade association that adopted the ICA rules would be 
given a seat on the ICA Rules Committee. The Rules Committee debated rule changes 
and drafted proposals to be approved by the membership. A representative of the ICA 
explained the rationale behind this decision:
We will tell every cotton association, if they accept our rules, they can have a 
spot on our rules committee. So then they feel like they have a say in it, it is not 
just Liverpool telling them what to do.
By offering to incorporate other trade associations into the Rules Committee, the 
ICA was loosening control over this key agenda-setting function in order to gain broader 
support for its leadership in the sector. In sum, by changing rules, by framing them as 
representing business ethics, and by incorporating a broader spectrum of actors within 
its institutional structure, the ICA hoped to legitimate its claims to be an impartial and 
globally representative association.
Trade associations representing textile manufacturers and merchants in different 
regions responded differently to the ICA’s bid for hegemony based on their shifting 
competitive positions. As the ICA had pursued its hegemonic project, the ECC had 
successfully standardized the rules of the European trade associations. The Gydnia 
Cotton Association in Poland, the Belgian Cotton Association, the Association Française 
Cotonière (AFCOT) in France, and the Centro Algodonero Nacional in Spain had 
officially adopted the ECC rules. However, as the European textile sector had contin-
ued to decline (see Figure 5), ECC standardization efforts fractured. Given that many 
ECC industries could soon cease to exist, the Bremen Cotton Exchange in Germany 
instead chose to adopt the ICA rules.74 The ICA president held up the Bremen Cotton 
Exchange as an example:
[T]onight I call upon all other associations to support us in this [standardization] 
task through closer cooperation. Bremen is a fine example of this cooperation: 
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they support the idea of “one set of rules” and are currently working on replac-
ing the Bremen Rules with the International Rules. This is a vital step towards 
harmonization. We appeal to the remaining associations to join this process. In 
Abraham Lincoln’s words: united we stand, divided we fall.75
Soon after, an ICA representative reported that the Belgian Cotton Association, the 
Gdynia Cotton Association, and the Centro Algodonero Nacional had initiated discus-
sions regarding the adoption of ICA rules. The Gdynia Cotton Association officially 
adopted the ICA rules in 2010. From a depressed market position, these European 
associations began to see seats on the ICA’s Rule Committee as their best bet to main-
tain decision-making power over contract rules as their economic power dwindled.
However, the French association, AFCOT, was reluctant to adopt ICA rules, given 
their distinct position within the global cotton trade. The French textile industry had 
declined, but French cotton merchants were attempting to compete in the increasingly 
consolidated merchant sector. The French merchant Geocoton, in particular, had taken 
over the former French SOE CFDT, which had enjoyed export monopolies in West 
African countries in the postcolonial period.76 As its formal export monopolies ended 
with the privatization of both French and West African SOEs, Geocoton wanted to 
maintain its regional advantage in West Africa and saw use of its own contract rules as 
one way to do so.77 AFCOT reported that it aimed to maintain its special link to West 
African countries, including a French-speaking cotton culture, through the elaboration 
of common rules for contract sanctity and arbitration.78 By maintaining the French 
AFCOT rules, the merchants in AFCOT hoped to solidify relationships with the new 
class of West African domestic merchants emerging in the wake of SOE privatization.
While AFCOT was reluctant to adopt ICA rules, the leadership of the African 
Cotton Association (ACA) at the time took a role in promoting their adoption. From 
the perspective of some West African domestic merchants, adopting the ICA rules 
could be strategic. As the French now had to compete with other merchants to source 
African cotton, African merchants and producers hoped to play several companies 
against each other to escape to some degree the price-fixing that came with the French 
export monopoly. Becoming fluent in the ICA rules could help African merchants bet-
ter exercise their new bargaining power. Leaders of the ACA thus began to work with 
the ICA to facilitate workshops in African countries on how to use ICA rules.
Finally, the Indian trade associations,79 which had expressed resistance to the ICA 
rules in the past, had begun internal discussions around their adoption. Since the ICA 
launched its initial efforts to lead the standardization of contract rules, the Indian tex-
tile sector had grown significantly, becoming the second largest consumer of raw cot-
ton in the world behind China.80 Much like the CCA, there were benefits to adoption 
for Indian textile manufacturers: improving their reputation for contract sanctity to 
access on-call pricing. As such, representatives of the Indian industry decided to at 
least consider the ICA rules, as a representative of the Cotton Association of India 
(CAI) commented: “We want to study them. We’ve formed a committee . . . over the 
next year we are going to compare [the ICA rules] to our rules and see what we would 
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be agreeing to, if we were to adopt them.” But actors in the Indian sector still had 
misgivings regarding what they saw as a largely top-down imposition of the ICA rules. 
For example, as a panel of ICA representatives gave updates on the standardization 
process at the 2006 ICAC meetings, an Indian merchant reminded participants that 
what was needed was not just updates but a “consultative and consensus process.”
Despite this plan to consider the ICA rules, another opportunity was emerging for 
Indian merchants. In the course of a few years, India’s cotton production had dramati-
cally increased due to rising yields.81 The Indian sector surpassed the United States to 
become the second-largest cotton producer in the world behind China. As production 
significantly outstripped consumption, India radically increased its exports (see Figure 7), 
and its share of world cotton exports increased from 8 percent to 12 percent from 2005 
to 2007.82 Moreover, Indian merchants enjoyed a competitive advantage as the cotton 
trade became focused on China. Indian cotton was selling for three to five cents lower 
per pound than U.S. cotton given lower transport costs.83 With its increasingly signifi-
cant position on the export market, resistance to the ICA rules made sense as part of 
Indian merchants’ broader expansionary strategy. As an Indian merchant commented, 
“we were working on moving to the ICA rules . . . but [now] there is not as much inter-
est in moving it forward.” With growing exports, Indian merchants had the potential to 
“hook on” to China’s rapid growth by establishing direct trading relationships with 
Chinese textile manufacturers, allowing them to bypass transnational merchants and 
the ICA rules.
India’s Cotton Imports and Exports 1974–2007
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
M
et
ric
 T
on
s 
(1,
00
0s
)
Exports
Imports
Figure 7. 
Ibid.
30  Politics & Society 39(1)
In sum, the ICA had made inroads in its attempts to construct it leadership and 
control over cotton contract rules. Some trade associations had indeed begun adoption 
of the ICA rules. However, the ICA’s hegemonic project, launched due to the challenge 
posed by the CCA, created new strategic opportunities for weaker actors to demand 
greater representation in contract governance and, in the case of AFCOT and the CAI, 
to try to undermine the ICA’s claim to sectoral leadership. In terms of its broader goal 
to increase bargaining leverage vis-à-vis China, the ICA’s success was mixed. In a 
demonstration of its growing willingness to negotiate with the global cotton community, 
the CCA joined CICCA in 2007—an important step given CICCA’s close cooperation 
with the ICA and China’s general refusal as yet to participate in other international 
cotton bodies. Transnational merchants also convinced the CCA to work with them to 
offer educational workshops on rules for contracts and dispute arbitration for Chinese 
spinners. Despite these signs of cooperation, the CCA remained dedicated to the pro-
motion of the CCA contract and CIETAC arbitration. As of 2009, while some stan-
dardization has been achieved, contestation continues over whose rules will govern 
cotton contracts on a global stage.
Conclusion
Evidence from the case suggests that we need a more dynamic model of institution 
building in order to understand emerging forms of coordination and governance struc-
tures within commodity chains. Western, transnational merchants are not unrivalled in 
their attempt to claim institutional power in the cotton trade, as GCC scholarship often 
implies through its emphasis on ideal types of corporate-led governance structures. 
Rather, the Chinese state made its own bid to set rules to govern cotton imports to 
ensure the competitiveness of its textile and apparel sectors. This indicates the need 
to revise existing accounts in order to explore contested processes of institution-
building in commodity chains. Such an approach allows us to explore not only how a 
commodity chain is governed but also how a given governance structure and the forms 
of coordination that underpin it emerge and are constructed as legitimate.
Understanding how private governance is constructed as legitimate and thus enfor-
ceable requires a revision and extension of GCC/GVC scholarship. First, we need to 
complicate the conceptualization of agency within GCC/GVC analyses. While the 
GCC framework does see transnational firms as agents that organize commodity 
chains to serve their interests, by failing to consider the legitimacy of these arrange-
ments, agency becomes narrowly defined in terms of who can exercise the most eco-
nomic power. The GVC framework tends to overlook agency entirely.
The case of cotton contract rules lays bare the overly static view of governance that 
results from these approaches and demonstrates the need to consider how strategic 
action and competition shape institution-building. Who would control contract rules 
could not be read off the economic structure. Rather, actors strategized and struggled 
to construct a set of rules and an institutional structure that would best reflect their 
interests and be accepted by other actors. These were not unrivalled “lead” actors but 
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institutional entrepreneurs actively reconfiguring institutional arrangements to solve 
their problems. In this view, it was strategic action that played a critical role in con-
structing the—albeit partial and tentative—legitimacy of the ICA rules.
Yet, this strategic action in negotiations was constrained by the broader institutional 
context in which negotiations were embedded. This points to another revision required 
in the existing framework. GCC/GVC scholars have been widely criticized for focus-
ing on variables endogenous to commodity chains to explain governance, ignoring the 
broader institutional context in which commodity chains are embedded. However, 
broader institutional shifts play a critical role in constituting the overall power dynam-
ics in a commodity chain. It was shifts in the broader institutional context—the end of 
the MFA and the accession of China to the WTO—that reconfigured power dynamics, 
making China a major player in contract rule negotiations.
Broader institutional arrangements structured both the material and discursive ter-
rain of struggle in the cotton trade. In transnational merchants’ efforts to persuade 
others to accept their rules and trade association, they enjoyed a privileged position. 
Their preferred institutional arrangements for private contract governance had already 
been globalized in the 1958 New York Convention, and many states had been com-
pelled to sign on to this Convention through structural adjustment programs. Moreover, 
this Convention had legitimized discourses about what made contract governance fair, 
specifically the idea that actors enter into contracts freely and consensually. Transnational 
merchants were able to draw on and reconstruct these discourses in their effort to 
define ethical business practices and legitimate their rules.
The case of cotton contract rules also complicates our understanding of institutional 
context in another way. Exploring institutional context means considering not only 
new supranational institutions, discourses, and agreements but also the diverse institu-
tional arrangements in which different actors have historically been embedded. As 
economic geographers and varieties of capitalism scholars have suggested, we need to 
account for institutional variation across space.
GCC/GVC research has largely ignored such variation. From this view, actors’ 
interests and strategies can be understood by virtue of their functional position on the 
commodity chain. As negotiations in the cotton trade suggest, this perspective over-
looks other critical dimensions. In the cotton trade, different actors have historically 
been embedded in different institutional arrangements for governing contracts, such as 
private versus state governance, governance of nationally versus regionally versus 
postcolonial-focused trade, and governance embedded in different state legal systems. 
As such, actors have developed distinct business practices, customs, and competen-
cies, as well as understandings of what makes contract governance fair. Actors’ dis-
tinct institutional embeddedness critically shaped how they responded to transnational 
merchants’ bid to control contract rules. This is not to say that an actor’s functional 
position in a chain does not matter. Indeed, a key point of contention between transna-
tional merchants and the Chinese state was over their different interests in how quality 
would be governed, given their positions as sellers vs. buyers. However, functional 
position alone is not sufficient for understanding why the issue of whose arbitral body 
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would settle disputes was a critical point of contention. It is only by considering insti-
tutional variation across space that we can trace the advantages gained by compelling 
others to “play by your rules.”
A broader view of strategic action, competitive dynamics, and institutional context 
also raises new questions for Gereffi’s typology of chains and the general claim that 
chains are becoming more buyer-driven in the current era. My case tentatively con-
firms that the trader-driven nature of the cotton chain is being challenged by buyer-
driven dynamics. However, Gereffi’s typology leaves us unable to account for how 
and why such changes emerge except to posit the growing power of retailers. Evidence 
from this case and existing scholarship suggests that a more complex analysis is neces-
sary. Gibbon and Ponte argue that changes in trade rules can influence whether pro-
ducers or buyers “drive” a particular commodity chain.84 I confirm this claim, as we 
see how the end of the MFA and the accession of China to the WTO upset the initial 
trader-driven nature of the chain. However, my analysis further suggests that the 
trader- versus buyer-driven nature of the cotton trade is a point of contestation, and 
the victor will not emerge through economic dominance alone. Rather, who drives a 
chain should be understood as constructed through competition for both economic and 
institutional power.
In sum, evidence from the cotton trade demonstrates the need for modifications to 
the GCC/GVC framework. I have put forth a more dynamic model that captures how 
private governance is constructed through the intersection of strategic action, dominant 
discourses, existing institutional arrangements, and competitive dynamics. These find-
ings underline the importance of attending to institutional context, institutional varia-
tion across space, and the cultural political economy of commodity chains. It is only by 
exploring this more dynamic process of institution-building that we can understand 
how and why transnational governance arrangements emerge and are established as 
legitimate and enforceable.
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